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Summer List 11, Sheet 1

(

No. 84-1973

~

Cert to Supreme Court of N.
Dakota (Erickstad, C.J.,
VandeWalle, Girke, Pederson
[ Sur r og ate J) )

Three Affiliated Tribes

v.
Wold Engineering, et
al.

1.

state

-

statute
- ---7

SUMMARY:

Timely

State/Civil

Petr

presents

depriving '~ribal

two

,.

issues:

plaintiffs

-

of

( 1)

access

Whether
to

a

state

'-""'

courts in circumstances where non-Indian plaintiffs may maintain
actions violates tribal plaintiffs' equal protection rights; and
(2) Whether federal law prohibits a state from requiring an Indi-

.

-

2 -

an tribe to waive its immunity from state civil jurisdiction for

-----------

--~

all cases as a condition for bringing a damages action against a
non-Indian defendant in state court.
2.

FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW:

This Court
holding

the

reviewed

challenged

the N.D.
state

S.Ct. 's initial decision up-

statute

court's dismissal of petr 's action for
jurisdiction.

(May

29,

affirming

the

state

want of subject matter

See Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold

Reservation v.
4647

and

Wold Engineering
1984).

Because

(Three Tribes

I),

52

U.S.L.W.

it was unclear whether the N.D.

S.Ct. 's decision rested on a misinterpretation of federal law,
vJ~

this Court

~Mot

acated the judgment and remand

the state law ques 10n.

for reconsideration

On remand, the N.D. s.ct. held that

the challenged state statute barred petr, a federally recognized
Indian tribe,

from maintaining its damages suit against resp, a

non-Indian engineering firm, in state court as a matter of state
law and that this jurisdictional bar did not violate the state or
federal constitutions. Petr therefore petitions the Court to review

the

constitutional

challenge

it

did

not

reach

in

Three

Tribes I.

The following is an attempt to summarize the progress

of petr 's

litigation from

its

incept ion to the present;

for a

fuller presentation, see Three Tribes I.
The

federal government eliminated

its pre-existing bar of

state jurisdiction over Indian territories in 1953 with the enactment of Pub.

L.

280.

As applied to N.

Dakota, Pub.

L.

--

280

permitted the state to amend the federally-imposed disclaimer of
jurisdiction over Indian country contained in the N. Dakota con-

?

- 3 -

stitution and to assume jurisdiction over civil and criminal actions involving Indians and arising in Indian country.
In 1957 (before the state moved to assume jurisdiction under
Pub. L. 280), the N.D. S.Ct. held that the existing jurisdictional bar foreclosed civil jurisdiction over Indian lands only in
cases involving interests in Indian lands themselves.

Vermillion

v. Spotted Elk, 85 N.W.2d 432 (1957).
In

19 58,

N.

Dakota amended

its constitution to allow for

assumption of jurisdiction over Indian country and in 1963 the N.
Dakota

legis';::;;;"r~ en;c_te~ which ~ro~es:

-

In accordance with the provisions of Public Law
280
and [the amended] North Dakota constitution,
jurisdiction of the state of North Dakota shall be extended over all civil causes of action which arise on
an Indian reservation ~~n = acceptan&3 by Indian citirov i'<fe
by this chap~acce ance the jurisdict1o o
shall be to the
same extent that the state has jurisdiction over other
civil causes of action, and those civil laws of this
state that are of general application to private property shall have the same force and ef feet with in such
Indian reservation or Indian coun ry as t ey have e sewhere within

(

--

The consent provision contained in ch. 27-19 was included in
response to Indian concerns about having state civil jurisdiction
imposed upon them against their will.
In subsequent cases, The N.D. S.Ct. read ch. 27-19 to constitute a disclaimer of state jurisdiction (recognized in Vermillion) in the absence of Indian acceptance of jurisdiction.
cases, however, all involved Indian defendants;

Those

the S.Ct. never

explicitly passed on the question of whether "residuary jurisdiction"

remained

in

Indian defendants.

(

cases

involving

Indian

plaintiffs

and

non-

- 4 -

•
In 1968, Pub. L. 280 was amended to require that all subsequent

state

assurnpt ions of

juri sd ict ion be preceded

by

tribal

consent.
The instant controversy began when Petr encountered diffi-

.\ '

culty with the water system project it had contracted with resp
to design for
t'

the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.

As petr's

~\

tribal court did not have jurisdiction over the suit, petr sued
resp in N. Dakota state court, alleging negligence and breach of
contract.
pay it.

Resp counterclaimed, asserting that petr had failed to
The court dismissed the action on the ground that it did

~

not have the subject rna t ter juri sd ict ion to hear claims arising

$r cl-'

•..

>J

~
,.~

,

..,.._

in Indian country absent tribal consent, which had not been give ~
by the Three Affiliated Tribes.

The N.D. S.Ct. affirmed the dis-

missal, holding that "pursuant to Public Law 280," the N. Dakota
legislature had totally disclaimed any

jurisdiction over civil

causes of action arising on an Indian reservation absent tribal
consent.
tiff

from

The S.Ct. also held that prohibiting an Indian plainsuing

a

non-Indian

in

state

court

in circumstances

where a non-Indian could maintain such a suit does not deny Indians equal protection in violation of the federal constitution or
equal access to the courts in violation of the N. Dakota constitution.
"Because

of

the

cornplexi ty

and

importance

of

the

issue"

posed by the N.D. S.Ct. 's decision, Three Tribes I, 52 U.S.L.W.,
at 4650, this Court granted certiorari.

The

Co~eld

that no

federal law or policy precludes N. Dakota from asserting the jur isd iction recognized

·(

in Vermillion over claims such as petr 's

- 5 -

(i.

e.,

Indians

suing

non-Indians).

In

~

particular,

the

Court
)

ruled that Pub. L. 280 neither required N. Dakota to disclaim the

......----...

basic jurisdiction recognized
do so.

in Vermillion or authorized

it to

Id., at 4651. The Court then had to determine whether the

N.D. S.Ct. had held that ch.

27-19 foreclosed petr's suit purely

as a matter of state law, in which case the Court would be faced
with

petr 's

federal

constitutional challenges

After examining the N.D.
that

the

S.Ct.

S. Ct. 's reasoning,

apparently

based

its

to

that

statute.

the Court concluded

decision on

the

erroneous

~

---

assumption that Pub. L.

280 either authorized the jurisdictional

disclaimer or forbade the exercise of jurisdiction absent tribal
) co:_:_~t:_:-TThe Court therefore vacated the state court

judgment

~nd remanded for reconsideration of the state law question.
Justice

Rehnquist,
_,.

joined

The dissent disagreed with

by

Justice

the Court's

Stevens,

dissented.

reading of Pub.

L.

280,

asserted that the N.D. S.Ct. 's resolution of the issue was based
on state law, and noted that the only remaining federal question
presented, petr's equal protection claim, was insubstantial given

Tribes

of

the

Yakima

439

Indian

u.s.

463

( 1979) (discussed below) •
On remand,
27-19]

the N.D.

itself nor

[its]

ognizes any type of
that

[ch.

27-19]

viously exist."

S. Ct.

held

that because

legislative history provides for or

'residuary'

state

[ch. ~~
.n--rec ~

jurisdiction, we conclude

terminated any such jurisdiction if it did preApp. A-8.

It emphasized that its decision rest-

ed on "independent and adequate state grounds."

(

"neither

App. A-16.

The

- 6 -

S.Ct.

then held that the statute, so construed, did not violate

any provision of the N. Dakota constitution.
Finally, the S.Ct. held that the jurisdictional bar did not
violate petr's federal equal protection and due process rights.

-----

---------------

It rejected petr's assertion that "Chapter 27-19 represents constitutionally suspect class-based legislation that singles out a
discrete,

insular minority for d i sad van taged leg isla t i ve treat-

ment," citing Yakima, supra, as controlling.
In Yakima,

the Washington legislature passed a statute that

required the state to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over
Indians and Indian territory within the state, on the condition
that

in all but eight subject matter areas,

j ur isd iction would

not extend to Indians on trust or restricted lands absent request
of the tribe.

The statute provided that in the remaining eight

areas, the state would unconditionally assume jurisdiction.

(

Court held,
risdiction

The

inter alia, that this "checkerboard" pattern of juapplicable

on

tribes was not on its face

the

reservations

invalid under

of

non-consenting

the equal protect ion

clause.
In

arriving

at

this

tribe's contentions that (1)

conclusion,

the

Court

rejected

the

the classifications implicit in the

statute were "suspect" and therefore could not stand unless justified by a compelling state interest, and (2) the tribe's interest

in

self-government

is a fundamental

right and because the

statute abridged that right, it was presumptively invalid.
at 500.

Id.,

The Court reasoned that due to the unique status of In-

dian tribes under Federal law,

the Federal Government may enact

- 7 -

-

legislation

that might

otherwise

be

because it singles out tribal Indians.

constitutionally offensive
Id., 501.

The Court then

found that although the states do not have the same prerogative,

t

. ·.

Pub. L.

280 authorized the Washington statute at issue and con-

ta ined many of the same classifications; thus the argument that
the classifications were suspect was untenable.
noted

that

abridges

"[t]he

a

1

contention

fundamental

right 1

well established that Congress,
power over
powers

that

[the

The Court then

challenged
It

is also untenable.

statute]
is also

in the exercise of its plenary

Indian affairs, may restrict the retained sovereign

of

the

statute],

Indian

Washington

tribes
was

In enacting

legislating

under

[the challenged

explicit

authority

granted by Congress in the exercise of that federal power."

Id.

The Court then applied the rational relationship standard of review and found the statute constitutional on its face.

(

3.

CONTENTIONS: Petr first contends that the N. Dakota

statute violates its equal protection rights in that it subjects
a discrete and insular class (tribal Indians residing on federal
reservations)
right

(access to the courts).

Rather,

u.s.

to disadvantaged treatment regarding a fundamental

it

relies

Petr does not distinguish Yakima.
430

on United Jewish Organization v.

144, 165 (1977), and Regents of University of California v.

(§;>

438 U oSo 265, 298

cally or

racially

(1978) , for the proposition that ethni-

based state

legislation that

is

intended

to

minimize the consequences of racial discrimination is subject to
heightened scrutiny.

It then uses various concerns mentioned in

Justice Brennan 1 s Carey concurrance to test the validity of the

-

430

statute.

u.s.,

0

at 172-176.

-

In particular, petr argues that

ch. 27-19 is invalid because it in fact stigmatizes and disadvan-

:7

~

tages tribal Indians.

~
Petr's s~ , which may not have been raised below
as the N.D. S.Ct. did not mention it,

is that federal law pre-

eludes a state from requiring that Indians waive their sovereign
immunity in all cases as a condition for suing in state court.
Petr claims that because a blanket waiver of sovereign immunity
would disrupt its federally recognized rights of tribal autonomy
and self-government, authority for requiring such a waiver must
come from Congress.
Resp responds

to petr 's equal protection claim by arguing

that the classifications contained in ch. 27-19 are politically,
not racially, based.

It asserts that N. Dakota initially pro-

posed to unilaterally take full jurisdiction over Indian country
pursuant to Pub.

L.

280

(prior to the 19 68 amendment)

but,

in

response to Indian residents' objections, arrived at a political
compromise whereby the state would not assume any jurisdiction
over claims by or against Indians until the tribe consented.

It

notes that disparate treatment based on political differences is
not automatically constitutionally suspect.
417

u.s.

537 (1974).

to strike

the

Morton v. Mancar i,

Moreover, it argues that if this court were

juri sd ict ional bar

to Indians bringing suit,

it

would be unfair to non-Indians who may not sue Indians in state
court.

In this case, for example, petr might be able to recover

against resp, but resp would be unable to maintain its counterclaim against petr in state court.

Finally, resp relies on Yaki-

-

9 -

rna, and states that the statute is rationally related to legitiResp' s

mate state policies.

response

to petr 's second argument

~--~·, ~-~~4W~

is difficult to make out.

/~---''
Vk-~~~~~
DISCUSSION: Yakima stands for the proposition that~~~

4.

a state acting pursuant to congressional authority can single out
Indians

for

offensive.

treatment

--·-- -

that might otherwise

be constitutionally

It does not seem to control in this case because the

Court held in Three Tribes I that Pub. L. 280 does not authorize
or

require

states

to

disclaim

pre-existing

jurisdiction

claims asserted by Indians against non-Indians.

over

Once Yakima

is

distinguished, petr's equal protection claim presents a substantial question, under traditional equal protection analysis if not
under

-------------------------------~
It is unclear whether petr's

the analysis petr presents.

second argument is properly before the Court as it does not seem
to have been argued be low.
ments based on 42
tion

of

the

u.s.c.

United

State and Territory
zens.")

Petr did not present argu-

§1981 ("All persons within the jurisdic-

States
••.

(Note:

shall have

the

same

right

in every

to sue •.• as is enjoyed by white citi-

in state court or in the instant petition).

The SG requested that the Court take cert in Three Tribes I.
Because petr's equal protection claim appears viable and the same
considerations that justified review in the last round would seem
to hold true, I recommend GRANT.
There is a response.
August 9, 1985

O'Sullivan

opn in petn
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

March 5, 1986

Cabell

No. 84-1973, Affilliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, et al.
Cert to NO s.ct.

Mon., Mar. 24 (1st case)

Question Presented
Does
plaintiffs

North

from

Dakota's

Chapter

State courts unless

27-19,
the

which

bars

tribal

tribe waives sovereign

immunity before those courts, violate Equal Protection, Due Process, or "Indian policy and decisional law"?

!.

BACKGROUND
In

1963,

the

North

Dakota

legislature

27-19, the Indian Civil Jurisdictional Act.

------

a

tribal government must waive

immunity

enacted

Chapter

Onder Chapter 27-19,

from State court civil

jurisdiction in all cases to bring an on-reservation damages action against a non-Indian defendant.

Petr,

the Three Affiliated

Tribes have never made such a waiver.
In 197 4,

petr contracted with resps

water project on petr's reservation.
tern Project,"

however,

was

a

for a public works

The "Four Bears water Sys-

failure,

and

in

1980 petr

sought

redress against resp in state court, alleging breach of contract
and negligence.

Resp successfully moved to have the court dis-

miss the action on the ground that the state court lacked subject
matter

jurisdiction since

the case

arose on an

Indian reserva-

tion.

holding

The

North

that

the

Dakota
N.D.

Supreme

State

Court

Legislature

affirmed
had

the

result,

authority

to pass

Chapter 27-19 under an Act of Congress, Public Law 280, and that

unt~i_l_~b=._ co~_t_e_d_....to__j _u_r_~_s_d_i_c__!,_i_52_n___i_~ @

state

court

cases, the present action was barred.
~

This Court,

per

JO.S'l'ICE BLACKMON,

vacated and remanded

because of a possible misreading of federal law.

-

This Court held

that federal law did not compel the State Act, and the Court remanded for the State Supreme Court to determine whether the .State
~~--~------~-~-~-~--~-~-----~------------------------------------·~~
had foreclosed~ as a matter of State rather than fed~

eral law.
,..

._..,

JUSTICE REHNQOIST, joined by JO.STICE .STEVENS, dissent-

ed, arguing that the federal question presented was insubstantial

...
'

under Washington v. Yakima
(1971),

where

the

Court

u.s.

Indian Nation, .439

rejected

a

challenge

463,

to

a

500-501

Washington

statute that conditioned state jurisdiction over Indian lands in
(In Yakima, howev-

f

the State was acting pursuant to explicit congressional au-

f

some subject matter areas on Indian consent.
er,

thor i ty.)
On remand,

in a testy opinion,

the State Supreme Court

held that Chapter 27-19 terminated any pre-existing right to sue
non-Indians

in

State courts

under Vermillion v.

that tribal plaintiffs could claim

Spotted Elk,

85 N.W.2<( 342

(1957), and that

those plaintiffs could litigate in State courts only after their
tribe had completely submitted to State court jurisdiction.

II.

DISCUSSION
Chapter 27-19 is a statute based on a racial classifica-

--

tion

therefore

and

denial of

access

subject

to

strict

to courts

is

a

-

scrutiny.

second,

subject the statute to strict scrutiny.

The

statute's

independent reason

to

Chapter 27-19 also vio--·~~-~-·--

----

lates Federal Indian - law embodied both in this Court's decisions
and in Pub.L. 90-284.

A.

Pub.L. 90-284
Petr s

Pub.L.

90-284

evidenced

and

Standing

Rock

Sioux Tribe argue

that

(Title IV of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968)

Congress'

·exclude any

amicus

future

intent

to completely

occupy

acquisition by States over

the

field

and

Indian affairs -

including by tribal transfer - except as allowed by federal stat-

Jtz,/A~

~

ute.

Kennerly

Pub.L.

v.

District Court,

400

u.s.

423

(1971).

Under

90-284, a tribe cannot consent to a transfer of jurisdic-

tion to a State without a majority vote of the adult tribal Indians at a federally supervised election.
Court

has

held

25 o.s.c.

that Congress completely occupied

§1326.
the

This

field

in

,I

Pub.L. 90-284 regarding future state acquisition of any jurisdicKenn~rlY

tion over Indian affairs.
429

(holding

Pub.L.

90-284

civil jurisdiction over

v. District Court, supra, at

prohibited

Montana's

assumption of

tribal Indians on reservation even with
•',

consent of tribal government).
Resp argues that Pub.L.

90-284 is. inapposite because it

applies only to post-1968 acquisitions of jurisdiction.
resp argues,

Chapter 27-19 took

[North DakotaJ

In 1963,

"all steps required to obligate

to an assumption of jurisdiction," and that Chap-

ter 27-19 "is therefore not affected by later Congressional acts
which now govern the actions of other states in assuming jurisdiction over Indian country."

Resp Brief 9-10.

This character-

ization, however, is at odds with later sections of resp's brief.
!d., at 22 · (Chapter 27-19 "completely disclaimed all jurisdiction
in Indian country").
precedent.

In

re

It is also at odds with N.D. Supreme Court

Whiteshield,

124

N.W.2d

State did not assume jurisdiction in 1963).
acterized the State law:

"Chapter

694

(1963)

(holding

As this Court char-

27-19 actually disclaimed all

jurisdiction over claims arising in Indian country absent Indian
consent."

Wold 1, 104 s.ct., at 2272.
1

believe

Chapter

27-19

conflicts

with

Pub.L.

90-284

because it does not condition a transfer of Indian jurisdiction

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I

upon a federally supervised election~

~he~efore,

it is possible

~

to overturn the law solely because of its conflict with the preempting

federal

law,

Pub.L.

'!'he

90-284.

disadvantage

of

this

simple and clean disposition is that it leaves the State free to
enact a successor to Chapter 27-19 that provides for federal supervision

of

elections

while

continuing

to

predicate

Indians'

access to court upon a complete waiver of their sovereign immunity.

Because

I

believe

that

this

hypothetical

replacement

to

Chapter 27-19 is likely, and because I believe that the State may
not constitutionally impose such a condition upon Indians' access

------------

--------

to its courts,
tection

and

I

Due

recommend you consider reaching the

Process

arguments

raised

by

petr

Equa~_ Pro-

and

amicus

Standing Rock Sioux Tribe.

B.

Violation of Equal Protection
Petr and amicus make a straightforward Equal Protection

argument.

Chapter 27-19 makes a classification based solely on

race (Indians are a discreet and insular minority), and therefore
that statute is subject to strict scrutiny.

Loving v. Virginia,

388 u.s. 1, 9 (1967).
Resp and the State s.ct. first argue that Chapter 27-19
is

justified by

Brief 29-31;

the special federal power over

364 N.W.2d,

at 106-107.

Indian affairs.

Resp and its allies argue

that because Congress may make rules and impose regulations concerning

Indians

that

because

Chapter

27-19

Pub.L.

280

would
was

otherwise
enacted

as

be
a

unconstitutional,
specific

response

and
to

(allowing State assumption of jurisdiction over Indi-

~
~

&/fl

'

~~~

,,_-c....c.,.

ans), Chapter 27-19 is cloaked by the same protection that federal laws enjoy.
It

is,

certain State

of

course,

true

that

Pub.L.

280 would

legislation from strict scrutiny even though

State Act may be based on a racial classification.
does not,

protect

however,

the

Pub.L.

280
shield any legislation that concerns Indians

and State jurisdiction.

Certainly it is clear that the State Act

must have a clear and substantial relation to the congressional
-- ~-law that State cites for constitutional safe passage.
If it were
- ""--"-"
------------~----~
there would

-----.-------------------------

~

otherwise,
tent.

be no elephant too big to fit under that

There is nothing in the text of Pub.L. 280 that would jus-

tify ~

which

27-19 is.

is essentially what Chapter

See Wold I, 104 s.ct., at 2276, 2277-2278.
Resps also defend Chapter 27-19 as a political classifi-

cation under
case,

the

Morton v.

Court

held

Mancari,
that

the

471

u.s.

"unique

535

legal

(1974).
status

In that
of

Indian

tribes under federal law," id., at 551, permits the federal government to single out tribal

Indians

otherwise be unconstitutional.

in legislation that might

The holding was bottomed on the

constitutional grant of power of Indian tribes, Art.

I, §8, cl.

3, and the longstanding federal role as guardian and protector of
Indian tribes.

~.,

at 551-553.

The States do not enjoy a simi-

lar special relationship with Indian tribes.

Washington v. Yaki-

rna Inidan Nation, 439 u.s. 463, 501 (1979).
Resps
fairly
Indians

advances
and

make

a

final

argument

that

Chapter

27-19

"more

the goals of equal protection" by placing both

non-Indians

"on

equal

footing

before

the

State's

1

courts."

Brief

This

13.

silly argument , scarely deserves men-

tion, and has long since been put to rest.

u.s.

217

Williams v. Lee, 358

(1959); United States v. United States Fidelity

u.s.

anty Co., 309

&

Guar-

506, 512-513 (1940); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v.

Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324, 1344-1345 (CAlO 1982).
'!'he

State,

as

amicus,

also

does not violate Equal Protection

argues

(or

that

Chapter

Due Process)

27-19

because

the

law "does not act as a bar, but rather acts as an opportunity for
Indians and Indian tribes to take advantage of the jurisdictional
offer given them by the State of North Dakota."

Brief 2.

argument

it

over looks

Chapter

27-19's

crucial

sin:

This

closes

the

---------~--------~-?

------------------------

state courts to suits by Indian plaintiffs unless they surrender

-----

their sovereignty.

c.

~

Violation of Due Process
Apparently as an alternate basis for unconstitutionali-

ty, petr argues that Chapter 27-19 violates Due Process by barring access to the courts and therefore infringing on their First
Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances.

Logan

v.

Zimmerman

Brush

Co.,

455

u.s.

422,

429-430

(1982); California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404

u.s.

508, 510 (1972).
Resp counters that Chapter 27-19 is an exercise of the

"[stateJ

interest

in fashioning

its own

rules of

tort law"

ensure compliance with the State's rules of procedure.
But 1 find
quirements,

to

Brief 11.

no evidence of an asserted waiver of procedural reand

it

is

my

understanding

that

although

tribal

o.

plaintiffs may enjoy sovereign immunity,
with

State

important,

procedural
resp 's

requirements

argument here

to

they still must comply

use

State

courts.

fails because Chapter

More

27-19

is

not a procedural provision, but a door-closing statute.

III.

CONCLUSION
( J

Chapter 27-19 conflicts with Pub.L.

28~ because

it al-

•

lows State assumption of jurisdiction without a federally supervised election.

It violates Equal Protection as a classification

based on race, and is not sanctioned either as a scion of permissible

federal

(~,

Indian classification

political classification.

Pub.L.

280)

or as a

Finally, Chapter 27-19 is not a proce-

dural requirement, but rather a door-closing statute that denies
Indians the right to bring suit in a defendant's court.
Dakota speaks with

forked

tongue.

I

recommend you fote

North
to re-

verse the N.D. Supreme Court on the ground that the statute violates the supremacy of federal Pub.L. 284, Equal Protection, and
Due Process.

March 5, 1986; 4:01 PM

Cabell

Ben. Mem.

..
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(Supreme Court of North Dakota)
(To be Argued March 24)

MEMO TO FILE:
This is an unexciting Indian case in which I was
one of only four who voted to grant.

I

did so because, at

least on its face, the Tribes appea1 to have a substantial
equal protection claim.l

I

an

few

easterner,

where

the

concede, however,
remaining

that being

tribes

now

have

equal rights under state laws, I am not at all comfortable
in cases like this one.
This case was

here

in 1984,

involving

the same

parties and the same statutes, and we remanded it to have
the
that

North Dakota Supreme Court construe
state.

decision,
engaged

My

clerk

though
respondent

I

will

doubt

have
its

engineering

to

the statutes of

take

relevancy.
firm

to

a

look at our
Three

design

a

'l'r ibes
public

I assume members of an Indian Tribe are within the
protection of the Equal Protection Clause.
I have not,
however, looked at our cases.

1

~.

works

--

project

-----

reservation.

within

the

f e derally

recognized

Indian

Three Tribes, believing that respondent was

guilty of negligence and faulty design, brought this tort
action in a
$425,000.
Chapter
C i vi 1
the

North Dakota state court claiming damages of
The

case

27-19

of

involves

North

J u r is d i c t ion

the effect and validity of

Dakota
·r his

Act" •

North Dakota courts,

Law

entitled

statute,

required

as

the

"Indian

construed

by

-jurisdiction

tribal governments

to

---------------~

waive
for

their
all

-

immunity from state court civil

cases

--------"""-

reservation

as

a

condition

as I

bringing an on~~
non-Indian
a
against

-----------------------action

damages

____

engineering firm in state
court.
...... - -----._
Court,

for

understand it,

The North Dakota Supreme

read Chapter 29-19 as barring

all

tribal plaintiffs from suing in a state court until
Hw.. -,;...:._/...~ ~
t~~~-e- compl1ed with Chapter 27-19 - i.e. have waived

/\

~r

immunity.

(l am not certain 1 fully understand how

Chapter 27-19 has been construed.)
of

The

\

Tribes

lack

of

consent

In any event, because

under

Chapter

27-19,

and

"'

pursuant to the state's authority under Public Law 280 to
adopt

jurisdictional

statutes,

the

North

Dakota

Supreme

Court affirmed the state trial court's dismissal of this
case for want of subject matter jurisdiction.

ln its decision below, the state supreme court claiming

that

independent

it

state

was

relying

on

bar red

ground

an

the

adequate

and

petitioners

from

----------~

bringing

this

tort

action

in

federal equal protection claim.
protection

claim,

as

I

state

courts,

despite

the

The essence of the equal

understand

it,

is

summarized

in

petitioner's brief as follows:
"The legislative distinction established by
Chapter 27-19, between similarly situated tribal
Indian plaintiffs and non-Indian plaintiffs,
creates a system of state court access that
rests solely on differences in racial or ethnic
characteristics.
This distinction entitles a
non-Indian defendant in state court to the
automatic dismissal, in these circumstances, of
any tribal plaintiff's damages action against
him.
However,
that
same
defendant,
under
Chapter 27-19's system of state court access, is
held to answer for any non-Indian's damages
action in these same circumstances."

In

support

of

this

claim

of

discrimination,

petitioners rely - interestingly enough - on Bakke as well
as Onited Jewish Organization v. Carey, 430
176, for

Indians

denied.

144, 172,

the view that the relevant standard is "stri..c_t,

or heightened, judicial
of

o.s.

-

an

~because

identifiable

racial

the civil rights

group

-

have

been

.....

On its face, this has a good deal of appeal.

I
brief

filed

favor

of

tend

to

by

the

affirming

Supreme Court.

think

nevertheless

state presents a
the

decision

that

the

strong

of

the

amicus

argument
North

in

Dakota

It is summarized as follows:

"The Indian tribes and Indian citizens of the
state have deprived themselves of access to
state courts because they have not accepted
state jurisdiction": 1fiis ~as not only to
ha~dian plaintiffs are involved,
but it also leads to hardship for non-Indian
plaintiffs who may have a legitimate cause of
action against an Indian tribe or an individual
Indian arising in Indian country.
"Access to the courts of North Dakota is
within the power of the petitioners.
The tribe
must
merely
consent
to
the
full
c1vil
jurrsarct:lOn Wfiich-oor'Enl3ako'f"cl,- pursuant · to
P. L. 2"81J, stands ready to of fer them."

lf, in fact, the right to sue in state courts is
proscribed

only

because

Three

Tribes

have

failed

to

consent to the full civil jurisdiction prescribed Pulbic
Law

280,

failed

the

question

to consent,

this failure valid?

and

becomes:
are

the

Why

have

reasons

Three

relied

Tribes

upon

for

Jo

Although my sympathies are with the Indians, 1 do
think

the case

is close and will welcome a bobtail memo

from my clerk.
L.F.P., Jr.
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84-1973, Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng.

Petr contends that ch.

27-19 bars Indian plaintiffs

from state court in circumstances where non-Indian plaintiffs
may

clearly

initiate

suit,

and

thereby

violates

the

Equal

Protection Clause.
The "reciprocity argument" of North Dakota runs as
follows: the Indian people have deprived themselves of access
to state courts because they have not accepted subject matter
jurisdiction

in suits brought against them.

Chapter 27-19,

so the argument goes, is "an opportunity" for Indians to put
themselves on an equal

footing with North Dakotians by ac-

cepting this "jurisdictional offer."
This is a mischievous argument.
that Indians are a

sovereign nation," and obscures

------------~---

effect

of

ch.

It ignores the fact

27-19.

--

The

State

has

closed

its

the

real

courts

to

suits by Indian plaintiffs unless they consent to State jurisdiction over their reservations and waive tribal sovereign
I\.

immunity

from

suit.

The

~\.

law effectively coerces

T""

-

tribes

to

surrender their sovereignty to gain access to state courts.

March 26, 1986; 8:50 AM

Cabell

Oral Arg. Supp.

t

To: The Chief Justice (
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens

~

../ , '

;9

U/

Justice O'Connor
Circulated: _ _ _
Z_1_1986
_ __

From:

~ N . J9~ ~
~· 4 ~~I~~ z, g-~Jcuiat.f_
ID_ __

---~ ~~
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
~f. t!J
·;-~
lstDRAFT

No. 84-1973

THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES OF THE FORT
BERTHOLD RESERVATION, PETITIONER
v. WOLD ENGINEERING ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
NORTH DAKOTA
[May - , 1986]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation, sought to sue respondent, Wold Engineering,
P. C., in state court for negligence and breach of contract.
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that Chapter 27-19 of
the North Dakota Century Code (1974) disclaimed the unconditional state court civil jurisdiction North Dakota had previously extended to tribal Indians suing non-Indians in state
court. It ruled that under Chapter 27-19, petitioner could
not avail itself of state court jurisdiction unless it consented
to waive its sovereign immunity and to have any civil disputes in state court to which it is a party adjudicated under
state law. 364 N. W. 2d 98 (1985). The question presented
is whether Chapter 27-19, as construed byt ne NOrtllbakota
Supreme Court, is repugnant to the federal Constitution or is
preempted by federal Indian aw.
C. ---..J
-

______.
I

This is the second time this Court has been called upon to
address this jurisdictional controversy. See Three Affiliated
Tribes v. Wold Engineering (Three Tribes!), 467 U. S. 138
(1984). Because the facts and procedural history of the litigation were set forth in some detail in Three Tribes I, our
present recitation will be brief.

~
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Historically, Indian territories were generally deemed beyond the legislative and judicial jurisdiction of the state governments. See id., at 142. This restriction was reflected in
the federal statute which admitted North Dakota to the
union, Enabling Act of Feb. 22, 1889, § 4, cl. 2, 25 Stat. 677,
and was embodied in the form of jurisdictional disclaimers in
North Dakota's original Constitution. See N. D. Const.,
Art. XVI, § 203, cl. 2 (1889). The preexisting federal restrictions on state jurisdiction over Indian country were
largely eliminated, however, in 1953 with Congress' enactment of the Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588, as amended,
28 U. S. C. § 1360, which is commonly known as Pub. L. 280.
Pub. L. 280 gave federal consent to the assumption of state
civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian country and provided the procedures by which such an assumption could be
made. See Three Tribes I, 467 U. S., at 143. As originally
enacted, Pub. L. 280 did not require the States to obtain the
consent of affected Indian tribes before assuming jurisdiction
over them, but Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1963
amended Pub. L. 280 to require that all subsequent assertions of jurisdiction be preceded by tribal consent. Pub. L.
90-284, §§ 401, 402, 406, 82 Stat. 78-80, codified at 25
u. s. c. §§ 1321, 1322, 1326.
As this Court explained in Three Tribes I,
"[e]ven before North Dakota moved to amend its Constitution and assume full jurisdiction under Pub. L. 280,
the North Dakota Supreme Court had taken an expansive view of the scope of state-court jurisdiction over
Indians in Indian country. In 1957, the court held [in
Vermillion v. Spotted Elk, 85 N. W. 2d 432] that the existing jurisdictional disclaimers in the Enabling Act and
the State's Constitution foreclosed civil jurisdiction over
Indian country only in cases involving interests in Indian
lands themselves." 467 U. S., at 143-144.
Although Vermillion was decided after the enactment of
Pub. L. 280, the North Dakota Supreme Court made clear

84-1973---0PINION
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that it was confirming pre-existing jurisdiction rather than
establishing a previously unavailable jurisdictional category.
Vermillion v. Spotted Elk, supra, at 435-436. See also
Three Tribes I, supra, at 150, n. 9.
That part of Vermillion that recognized jurisdiction over
non-Indians' claims against Indians impermissibly intruded
on tribal self-government and thus could not be sustained.
I d., at 148. See also Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382
(1976); Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217 (1959). But, as this
Court in Three Tribes I affirmed, North Dakota's recognition
of jurisdiction over the claims of Indian plaintiffs against nonIndian defendants was lawful because such jurisdiction did
not interfere with the right of tribal Indians to govern themselves and was not subject to Pub. L. 280's procedural requirements since the jurisdiction was lawfully assumed prjor
to that enactment. See 467 U. S., at 148-149, 151, n. 11.
In 1958, North Dakota amended its Constitution to authorize its legislature to provide by statute for the acceptance of
jurisdiction over Indian country, see N. D. Const., Art.
XIII, § 1, cl. 2, and in 1963, the North Dakota legislature enacted Chapter 27-19. That Chapter provides, in pertinent
part:
"In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 280
... and [the amended] North Dakota constitution, jurisdiction of the state of North Dakota shall be extended
over all civil causes of action which arise on an Indian
reservation upon acceptance by Indian citizens in a manner provided by this chapter. Upon acceptance the jurisdiction of the state shall be to the same extent that the
state has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action,
and those civil laws of this state that are of general application to private property shall have the same force and
effect within such Indian reservation or Indian country
as they have elsewhere within this state." N. D. Cent.
Code § 27-19-01 (1974).

;
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In subsequent cases, the North Dakota Supreme Court read
this provision to "completely disclaim" the state jurisdiction
recognized in Vermillion in cases in which the defendant was
an Indian, absent tribal consent to jurisdiction as provided by
statute. See, e. g., In re Whiteshield, 124 N. W. 2d 694
(1963). However, until the instant suit, the court never
squarely held that Chapter 27-19 also disclaimed the jurisdiction Vermillion lawfully recognized over cases in which an
Indian sued a non-Indian in state court for a claim arising in
Indian country. See Three Tribes I, supra, at 144-145.
Petitioner filed the in~t_suit,.against respondent in state
court for negligence and breach of contract in connection with
respondent's cons ruction of a wa er-supply system on petitioner's reservation. At the time the suit was filed, petitioner's tribal court did not have jurisdiction over such claims.
After coun er-e a1mmg or peti 1oner's a ~e
payments on the ~stem, respondent moved to dismiss petitioner's iate eeHIIt complaint, arguing that the state court :f
had no jurisdiction ecause petitioner has never consented to
state-court jurisdiction over the Fort Berthold Reservation
under Chapter 27-19. The trial court dismissed the suit for
lack of jurisdiction, and the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal on appeal. 321 N. W. 2d 510 (1982).
In so doing, the North Dakota u erne Court held that
any residuary jurisdiction the North Dakota courts possessed
under Vermillion over suits by an Indian against a non-Indian arising in Indian country was "totally disclaimed" when
the North Dakota legislature, "(u]nder the authority of Public Law 280," instituted the consent requirement of Chapter
27-19. Id., at 511-512. It co!!£_lu~d that "we have no jurisdiction over civil causes of action arising within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation, unless the Indian
citizens of the reservation vote to accept jurisdiction." I d.,
at 512. The court also rejected petitioner's Federal and
State constitutional challenges, relying in part on the argument that the discrimination against Indian litigants embod-

- -------

T~

J.._a..i}

~

0

~
,

~

-
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ied in Chapter 27-19 was authorized by Pub. L. 280 and was
therefore insulated, under Washington v. Yakima Indian
Nation, 439 U. S. 463 (1979), from heightened scrutiny. See
321 N. W. 2d, at 512-513.
This Court granted certiorari. 461 U. S. 904 (1983). We
held that federal law did not preclude the state court/ from
asserting jurisdiction over petitioner's claim. In particular,
we ruled that Pub. L. 280 neither required nor authorized
North Dakota to disclaim the jurisdiction it had lawfully exercised over the claims of Indian plaintiffs against non-Indian
defendants prior to the enactment of Pub. L. 280. See Three
Tribes I, 467 U. S., at 150. Because the North Dakota
Supreme Court's interpretation of Chapter 27-19 and its accompanying constitutional analysis appeared to rest on a possible misunderstanding of Pub ..L. 280, this Court vacated the
judgment and remanded the case to allow the North Dakota
court to reconsider the jurisdictional questions in light of the
proper interpretation of the governing federal statute. I d.,
at 141.
On remand, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that
Chapter 27-19 terminated any residuary jurisdiction that
may have existed over claims arising in Indian country
brought by tribal Indians against non-Indians in state court.
364 N. W. 2d, at 104. It further held that state law barred
petitioner from maintaining its suit in state court absent its
waiver of its sovereign immunity in accordance with the statutory procedures. Id., at 103-104. Finally, the court rejected petitioner's due process and equal protection challenges. It stated that petitioner had not been denied a due
process right to access to the courts by action of the state,
reasoning that it was the Indian people who had deprived
themselves of access to state jurisdiction in declining to avail
themselves of the State's jurisdictional offer by waiving their
sovereign immunity. See id., at 106. The North Dakota
court then ruled that the jurisdictional disclaimer did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because, by virtue of the

/tJ:.

I
U
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consent provision, "[t]he statute does not treat [the Tribe]
less than equal, it treats them more than equal." !d., at 107.
We granted certiorari to examine etitioner's claims that
Chapter
vio ates the federal Constitution ~ i~e
empted b federal nd1an la . Although respondent at no
time objected to our cons1aeration of the federal preemption
issue, and in fact briefed it on the merits, our review of the
proceedings below indicates that this question was not explicitly raised before, and was not decided by the North Dakota
Supreme Court. We have recognized that in such circumstances that there is "weighty presumption against review."
Heath v. Alabama,-- U. S. - - (1985). See also Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 218-222 (1983). We believe, however, that this presumption has been overcome in this instance by a comoma ton o c urns ances.
1rst, respon en s fallure to raise any chaHenge to our
consideration of the preemption issue, cf. City of Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle,-- U.S.--,-- (1985), and its apparent
willingness to have the question decided, argues for review.
Second, this case has already been sent back to the North Dakota Supreme Court once, and we are reluctant to further
burden that court by resolving less than all the federal questions addressed by the parties. Since we have twice had the
benefit of the Supreme Court of North Dakota's reasoning on
closely aligned issues, we do not believe that our consideration of the federal preemption issue is a disservice to that
court or to the litigants, or impairs our informed decision of
the issue.
Because we believe that the North Dakota law is preempted insofar as it is applied to disclaim preexisting jurisdiction over suits by tribal plaintiffs against non-Indians for
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which there is no other forum, absent the Tribe's waiver of
its sovereign immunity and consent to the application of state
civil law in all cases to which it is a party, we reverse.
II

Our cases re~~"~end ... away from ~dea_2f inh~r
ent Indian soverei nty as a[n inde endent] bar to state jurisdictiOn ana toward, reUan<;e -.9n fe~ral pre-emption. " .Rice
v. Rehner, 463 U. S. 713, 718 (1983) (quoting - cClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 172 (1973) (footnote omitted)). Yet considerations of tribal sovereignty,
and the federal interests in promoting Indian self-governance
and autonomy, if not of themselves sufficient to "preempt"
state regulation, nevertheless form an important backdrop
agatnst which the applicable treaties and federal statutes
must be read. See, e. g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache
Tribe, 462 U. S. 324, 334 (1983); Rice v. Rehner, supra, at
718-719. Accordingly, we have formulated a comprehensive
preemption inquiry in the ndian aw contex w ic examines
no on y e congressional plan, but also "the nature of the
state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law." White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 145
(1980). In the instant case, this preemption inquiry yields
the conclusionthatt he legislative~ L.
28 forecloses North Dak ta from 1scla1ming Jlii=ISdiction
over petitio~it, and further, that the sta e interest
advanced by the North Dakota jurisdictional scheme in this
context is overshadowed by long-standing federal and tribal
interests.
A
Pub. L. 280 represents the primary expression of federal
policy governing the assumption by States of civil and criminal jurisdiction over the Indian Nations. The Act was the
result of "comprehensive and detailed congressional scru-
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tiny," Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U. S. 423,
424, n. 1, 427 (1971), and was intended to replace the ad hoc
regulation of state jurisdiction over Indian country with general legislation, providing "for all affected States to come
within its terms." S. Rep. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1953). See also Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of
State Jurisdiction. over Reservation Indians, 22 U. C. L. A.
L. Rev. 535, 540-544 (1975). In examining the effect of comprehensive legislation governing Indian matters such as this,
"our cases have rejected a narrow focus on congressional intent to pre-empt state law as the sole touchstone. They
have also rejected the proposition that pre-emption requires
'an express congressional statement to that effect.'" New
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, supra, at 334 (quoting
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, supra, at 144)
(footnote omitted). See also Rice v. Rehner, 463 U. S., at
719. Rather, we have found that where a detailed federal
regulatory scheme exists and where its generai thrust will be
impaired by incompatible state action, that state action, without more, may be ruled preempted by federal law. See,
e. g., Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380
u. s. 685 (1965).
.
Given the comprehensiveness of the federal regulation in
this area of Indian law, our conclusion in Three Tribes I that
Congress generally intendea to authonze the assumption, not
the disclaimer, of state jurisdiction over Indian country --.>
is
persuasive evidence that the instant disclaimer conflicts with
the federal scheme. See 4
. . , at 150. But we need not
restupon this conclusion alone, for Congress' specific treatment of the retrocession of previously assumed jurisdiction
permits no doubt that North Dakota's disclaimer is inconsistent with the requirements of Pub. L. 280.
As originally enacted, Pub. L. 280 plainly contemplated
that, if States chose to extend state court jurisdiction over
causes of action arising in Indian country, they would be required to honor that commitment, for the Act made no provi-
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sion for States to return any jurisdiction to the United
States. See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 370
(1982 ed.) (hereinafter Cohen). Congress' failure to provide
for the retrocession of jurisdiction assumed by the States is
fully consistent with the purposes underlying Pub. L. 280:
promoting the gradual assimilation of Indians into the dominant American culture and easing the fiscal and administrative burden borne by the federal government by virtue of
its control over Indian affairs. See Goldberg, supra, at
542-544. See also H. R. Rep. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
3, 6 (1953). Were States permitted to, at their option and at
any time, retrocede all or part of the jurisdiction they had assumed and to leave Indians with no recourse for civil wrongs ,
the congressional plan of gradual but steady assimilation
could be disrupted and the divestment of federal dominance
nullified.
When Congress subsequently revisited the question of retrocession in the 1968 Amendments, it provided that "[t]he
United States is authorized to accept a retrocession by any
State," 25 U. S. C. § 1323(a), but it specifically limited this
authorization to the retrocession of jurisdiction assumed
under Pub. L. 280 pursuant to the original1953 version of the
statute. See id. (permitting retrocession of jurisdiction "acquired by [the] State pursuant to the provisions of section
1162 of Title 18, section 1360 of Title 28, or Section 7 of the
Act of August 15, 1953 (67 Stat. 588), as it was in effect prior
to its repeal by subsection (b) of this section"). See also
Exec. Order No. 11435 (giving Secretary of the Interior discretionary authority to accept retrocession of jurisdiction by
a State); Goldberg, 22 U. C. L. A. L. Rev., at 558-559.
This retrocession provision apparently was added in response
to Indian dissatisfaction with Pub. L. 280. See Cohen 370.
In light of this congressional purpose, the fact that Congress
did not provide for retrocession of jurisdiction lawfully assumed prior to the enactment of Pub. L. 280 or of jurisdiction
assumed after 1968 cannot be attributed to mere oversight or
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inadvertence. Since Congress was motivated by a desire to
shield the Indians from unwanted extensions of jurisdiction
over them, there was no need to provide for retrocession in
those circumstances because the previously-assumed jurisdiction over Indian country was only lawful to the extent that
it was consistent with Indian tribal sovereignty and self-government, see, e. g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S., at 217, and
the jurisdiction assumed after 1968 could be secured only
upon the receipt of tribal consent. See 28 U. S. C. § 1321.
North Dakota may not, and indeed has not attempted to,
rely on § 1323(a) as authority for its disclaimer of jurisdiction
over claims such as petitioner's because it did not assume
such jurisdiction under any of the provisions specified in
§ 1323(a), nor has the United States accepted the retrocession. We have previously enforced the procedural requirements and the jurisdictional provisions of Pub. L. 280 quite
stringently, consistent with our understanding that the jurisdictional scheme embodied in that Act was the product of a
wide-ranging and detailed congressional study. See, e. g.,
Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U. S., at 427.
See also Washington v. Yakima I.ndian Nation, 439 U. S., at
484 ("the procedural requirements of Pub. L. 280 must be
strictly followed"); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U. S., at 180. Accordingly, we conclude that
since North Dakota's disclaimer is not authorized by
§ 1323(a), it is barred by that section.
In sum, because Pub. L. 280 was designed to extend the
jurisclict:Ton of the States over Indian country and to encourage State assumption of such jurisdiction, and because Congress specifically considered the issue of retrocession but did
not provide for disclaimers of jurisdiction lawfully acquired
other than under Pub. L. 280 prior to 1968, we must conclude
that such disclaimers cannot be reconciled with the congressional plan embodied in Pub. L. 280 and thus are preempted
byit.
~
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B

Our consideration of the State's interest in disclaiming the J
preexisting, unconditional jurlsCliction extended to tribal Indians suing non-Indian defendants, and in replacing it with an
extension of jurisdiction conditioned on the Tribe's waiver of
its sovereign immunity and its agreement to the application
of state law in all suits to which it is a party, reinforces our
conclusion that Chapter 27-19 is inconsistent with federal
law. Simply put, the state ~rest, as present! implemented, is unduly burdensome on the fe eral and tribal
interests.
s tne liforth Dakota Supreme Court explained, Chapter
27-19 was originally designed as a unilateral assumption of
jurisdiction over Indian country, which was intended to provide a means of enforcing contracts between Indians and nonIndians and a tribunal for trying tort actions, family law matters, and "many [other] types of actions too numerous to
mention." 364 N. W. 2d, at 102, and n. 5. The North Dakota legislature added the consent provision to Chapter 27-19
as a compromise to "accomodate the will of the Indian people." Id., at 103. Those Indians who opposed the assertion
of state jurisdiction against them would not be subjected to it
absent consent, but neither would they be permitted to enjoy
state jurisdiction as plaintiffs absent consent to suit as defendants. See id., at 107. Certainly, the State's interest in
requiring that all its citizens bear equally the burdens and the
benefits of access to the courts is readily understandable.
But here, federal interests exist which override this state
interest.
~
The federal interest in ensuring that all citizens have access to the courts is obviously a weighty one. See, e. g.,
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U. S. 509, 510, 513-514 (1972); Bill Johnson's Restaurants,
Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U. S. 731, 741, 742-744 (1983). This
Court and many state courts have long recognized that Indians share this interest in access to the courts, and that tribal

.l
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autonomy and self-government are not impeded when a State
allows an Indian to enter its court to seek relief against a nonIndian concerning a claim arising in Indian country. See,
e. g., Three Tribes I, 467 U. S., at 148, and n. 7 (citing authority). North Dakota conditions the Tribe's access to the
courts on its waiver of its tribal sovereign immunity and
agreement to the application of state civil law in all state
court civil actions to which it is or may be a party. These
conditions apply regardless of whether, as here, the Tribe
has no other effective means of securing relief for civil
wrongs. As the State concedes, even if the Tribe were to
have access to tribal court to resolve civil controversies with
non-Indians, it would be unable to enforce those judgments in
state court; thus, the Tribe cannot be said to have a meaningful alternative to state adjudication by way of access to other
tribunals in such cases. See Tr. Oral Arg. 26, 27. Cf.
Lohnes v. Cloud, 254 N. W. 2d 430 (ND 1977). Respondent
argues that the Tribe is not truly deprived of access to the
courts by the North Dakota jurisdictional scheme because the
Tribe could have unrestricted access to the State's courts by
"merely" consenting to the statutory conditions. We conclude,. however, that those statutory conditions may be met
only at an unacceptably high price to tribal sovereignty and
thus operate to effectively bar the Tribe from the courts.
The North Dakota jurisdictional scheme requires the Tribe
to accept a potentially severe intrusion on the Indians' ability
to govern themselves according to their own laws in order to
regain their access to the state courts. The statute provides
that "[t]he civil jurisdiction ·herein accepted and assumed
[upon Indian consent] shall include but shall not be limited to
the determination of parentage of children, termination of parental rights, commitments by county mental health boards
or county judges, guardianship, marriage contracts, and obligations for the support of spouse, children, or other dependents." N. D. Cent. Code § 27-19-08. Although these subjects clearly encompass areas of traditional tribal control, see

84-1973-0PINION
THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES v. WOLD ENGINEERING

13

Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S., at 388-389; Quiver v.
United States, 241 U. S. 601 (1916), the North Dakota statute contemplates that state civil law will control in these
areas. See § 27-19-01. Respondent argues that Chapter
27-19 safeguards tribal self-government by also providing
that any tribal ordinance or custom "shall, if not inconsistent
with the applicable law of this state, be given full force and
effect in the determination of civil causes of action pursuant
to this section." § 27-19-09. This provision plainly provides that state law will generally control, however, and will
merely be supplemented by nonconflicting Indian ordinances
or customs, even in cases that arise on the reservation, that
involve only Indians, and that concern subjects which are
within the jurisdiction of the tribal court.
This result simply cannot be reconciled with Congress' jeal-0
ous regard for Indian self-governance. See, e. g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U. S., at 334-335, and
n. 17 ("both the tribes and the Federal Government are
firmly committed to the goal of promoting tribal self-government, a goal embodied in numerous federal statutes"). See
also Fisher v. District Court, supra, at 388-389. "'A tribe's
power to prescribe the conduct of tribal members has never
been doubted, and our cases establish that 'absent governing
Acts of Congress,' a State may not act in a manner that infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them." New Mexico v. Mescalero
Apache Tribe, supra, at 332 (quoting McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S., at 171-172).
Chapter 27-19's requirement that the Tribe consent to suit
in all civil causes of action before it may again gain access to
state court as a plaintiff also serves to defeat the Tribe's federally-conferred immunity from suit. The common law sovereign immunity possessed by the Tribe is a necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance. See, e. g.,
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49 (1978). Of
course, because of the peculiar "quasi-sovereign" status of
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the Indian tribes, the Tribe's immunity is not congruent with
that which the Federal Government, or the States, enjoy.
United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309
U. S. 506, 513 (1940). Cf. also McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, supra, at 173. And this aspect of tribal
sovereignty, like all others, is subject to plenary federal control and definition. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
supra, at 58. Nonetheless, in the absence of federal authorization, tribal immunity, like all aspects of tribal sovereignty,
is privileged from diminution by the States.
To be sure, not all conditions imposed on access to state
courts which potentially affect tribal immunity, and thus
tribal self-government, are objectionable. For instance,
even petitioner concedes that its tribal immunity does not extend to protection from the normal processes of the state
court in which it has filed suit. See Tr. Oral Arg. 7, 10-11
("The Three Affiliated Tribes believe it would be proper in
the interests of justice that they would be subject to discovery proceedings and to proceedings that would insure a fair
trial to the non-Indian defendants"). Petitioner also concedes that a non-Indian defendant may assert a counter-claim
arising out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the
subject of the principal suit as a set-off or recoupment. See
Tr. Oral Arg. 6-7, 9. It is clear, however, that the extent of
the waiver presently required by Chapter 27-19 is unduly intrusive on the Indian's common law sovereign immunity, and
thus on its ability to govern itself according to its own laws.
By requiring that the Tribe open itself up to the coercive jurisdiction of state courts for all matters occurring on the reservation, the statute invites a potentially severe impairment
of the authority of the tribal government, its courts, and its
laws. See, e. g., Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S., at
387-388. *
*The extent to which respondent's counter-claim may be used not only
to defeat or reduce petitioner's recovery, but also to fix the Tribe's affirmative liability has been the subject of some discussion in this case. See,

1
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Pub. L. 280 certainly does not constitute a "governing Act
of Congress" which validates this type of interference with
tribal immunity and self-government. We have never read
Pub. L. 280 to constitute a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity, nor found Pub. L. 280 to represent an abandonment
of the federal interest in guarding Indian self-governance.
As we explained in Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373,
387-388 (1976):
"Today's congressional policy toward reservation Indians may less clearly than in 1953 favor their assimilation,
but Pub. L. 280 was plainly not meant to effect total
assimilation . . . . [N]othing in its legislative history remotely suggests that Congress meant the Act's extension of civil jurisdiction to the States should result in the
undermining or destruction of such tribal governments
as did exist and a conversion of the affected tribes into
little more than 'private, voluntary organizations,'"
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 557 (1975)
. . . . The Act itself refutes such an inference: there is
notably absent any conferral of state jurisdiction over
the tribes themselves, and §4(c), 28 U. S. C. § 1360(c),
providing for the 'full force and effect' of any tribal ordinances or customs 'heretofore or hereafter adopted by an
Indian tribe . . . if not inconsistent with any applicable
civil law of the State,' contemplates the continuing vitality of tribal government." (Footnote omitted).
Certainly, the 1968 Amendments to Pub. L. 280 pointedly
illustrate the continuing congressional concern over tribal
sovereignty. The impetus for the addition of a consent requirement in the 1968 Amendments was congressional dissatisfaction with the involuntary extension of state jurisdiction over Indians who did not feel they were ready to accept
e. g., Tr. Oral Arg. 6-11. We have no occasion to resolve this issue because the case comes to us before trial and we do not know the extent of
the counter-claim asserted by respondent.
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such jurisdiction, or who felt threatened by it. See, e. g.,
S. Rep. No. 90-721, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1968) (views of
Sen. Ervin) ("Tribes have been critical of Public Law 280 because it authorizes the·unilateral application of State law to
all tribes without their consent and regardless of their needs
or special circumstances. Moreover, it appears that tribal
laws were unnecessarily preempted ... .");Rights of Members of Indian Tribes: Hearing on H. R. 15419 and Related
Bills Before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 25 (1968) (referring to tribal consent requirement as
a way to ensure that Indians are not "subjected" to state
courts' jurisdiction before they are ready).
In sum, the State's interest is overly broad and overly intrusive when examinedagainst the bac~eral
anfithbal interests implicated in this case. See Rice v.
Rehner, 463 U. S., at 719. The perceived inequity of permitting the Tribe to recover from a non-Indian for civil
wrongs in instances where a non-Indian allegedly may notrecover against the Tribe simply must be accepted in view of
the overriding federal and tribal interests in these circumstances, much in the same way that the perceived inequity of
permitting the United States or North Dakota to sue in cases
where they could not be sued as defendants because of their
sovereign immunity also must be accepted. Our examination of the state, tribal, and federal interests implicated in
this case, then, reinforces our conclusion that North Dakota's
disclaimer of jurisdiction over suits such as this cannot be
reconciled with the congressional plan embodied in Pub. L.

~0.The judgment of the North Dakota Supreme Court is reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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